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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
In United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 
1969), we announced a prophylactic rule prohibiting the 
use of Allen charges. This appeal requires us to apply our 
decision in Fioravanti and its progeny to the supplemental 
charge given by the District Court during the jury's  
deliberation.1 The trial resulted in guilty verdicts on all 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. For the sake of clarity, we will only call a charge an Allen charge 
when 
the court directed the minority jurors to reconsider their views in light 
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counts against the three defendants: the Podlasecks, father 
Joseph and son David, and Eastern Medical Billing, Inc. 
("EMB"). Since we believe that the supplemental charge 
contravened our precedent, and had definite potential for 
coercive effect on the jury, we will REVERSE and REMAND 
for a new trial.2 
 
I. 
 
David Podlaseck was president of EMB, a company the 
Podlasecks started in 1992 to provide billing services for 
health care providers. David's father, Joseph Podlaseck, 
was EMB's primary salesman, and David's mother, Phyllis 
Podlaseck, was its treasurer and office manager. In October 
1993, EMB entered into a contract with Metro Ambulance 
("Metro"), whereby EMB would provide billing services for 
Metro, an authorized Medicare and Medicaid provider of 
ambulance services, which regularly transported dialysis 
patients to renal care centers using ambulances and vans. 
Metro, its principal, Jane Pflumm, and employee Jerry 
Johnson, were also indicted by the grand jury, and they 
pled guilty to the charges. 
 
The defendants were charged with: one count of 
conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 371; eleven counts of 
submitting false claims to the Health Care Financing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
of their disagreement with the majority. Cf. Black's Law Dictionary 74-75 
(6th ed. 1990) (defining "Allen charge" to encompass all instructions 
given to a deadlocked jury). Otherwise, we will refer to charges as the 
"original" or "initial" instruction or charge or as a "supplemental" 
charge 
if it was the court's second instruction. 
 
2. The 1999 trial was the second trial. The Podlasecks and EMB were 
first tried in 1997 and found guilty. However, the District Court granted 
their motion for a new trial after the defendants' post-trial motion 
raised 
concerns that jurors had engaged in pre-deliberation. We affirmed the 
District Court's decision in an unpublished opinion. See United States v. 
Eastern Medical Billing, Inc., 168 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 1998) (table) (No. 
98- 
7101). 
 
Since we dispose of this appeal based solely on the supplemental 
charge given during jury deliberations, we need not reach the remaining 
issues raised by the defendants. The defendants have been released on 
bail pending our decision. 
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Administration ("HCFA") of the Department of Health and 
Human Services, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 287; and four 
counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.S 1341. The 
factual basis for each count was the government's 
contention that the defendants agreed to, and knowingly 
did, submit false claims to HCFA for single passenger, 
medically necessary ambulance trips. In fact, groups of 
patients had been transported together in vans, not 
ambulances, and the use of ambulances had not been 
medically necessary. 
 
At trial, the government presented witnesses and 
documents to demonstrate that the Podlasecks had the 
necessary intent and knowledge to violate the law. The 
government focused especially on the meaning of certain 
coded run sheets that Metro drivers completed for each 
patient they transported, the form of which the Podlasecks 
had modified during the course of the allegedly illegal 
activity. Witnesses also testified about the Podlasecks' 
actions and about certain statements they made. Neither 
Jane Pflumm nor Jerry Johnson were called to testify. 
 
The Podlasecks argued that they acted as dupes of Metro, 
and challenged the honesty and accuracy of the 
government's witnesses at trial. One of the principal 
witnesses, Angela DeFelice, who testified on behalf of the 
government, was attacked as being essentially dishonest 
and biased.3 Other witnesses were similarly impeached.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Angela DeFelice was a data entry person at EMB hired to service the 
Metro account. DeFelice testified that when she began working at EMB 
she was told not to bill van trips, but that in October or November of 
1993 Joseph Podlaseck told her that Metro had been certified by 
Medicaid to provide van transport. DeFelice also testified that she was 
contacted by client Steve Betze who complained that a van trip he took 
had been billed incorrectly as an ambulance trip. DeFelice said she 
investigated the incident and told David Podlaseck, but David told her to 
either continue billing in the same way or to tell Betze that he could pay 
the $75 fee himself. DeFelice said she also raised the matter with Joseph 
Podlaseck and Joseph told her to do as David had said. Two months 
later, DeFelice contacted the police. At trial, the Podlasecks challenged 
her testimony, pointing out that she went to the police after EMB fired 
her, and introducing a character witness who testified that DeFelice was 
known in her community as being dishonest. 
 
4. Lori Cubbage, a Metro employee, testified that in October or November 
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Joseph Podlaseck also testified, and in its ruling on post- 
trial motions, the District Court sustained the verdict based 
in part on its view that Podlaseck's testimony lacked 
credibility. In light of the predominantly circumstantial 
nature of the evidence, the credibility issues on both sides, 
and the absence of testimony from the principal Metro 
officers directly involved in the offense conduct, we do not 
believe that the evidence at trial was "overwhelming." 
 
Following nine days of testimony, the jury commenced 
deliberations on a Tuesday. After two days of deliberations, 
on Thursday morning, the panel submitted a question: 
"Can the jury be `hung' on one defendant of the indictment 
and not the others?" One of the prosecutors mentioned the 
possibility of giving an Allen charge, but defense counsel 
and the Assistant United States Attorney agreed with the 
District Court's decision to simply write "yes" on the jury 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
of 1993, she overheard a conversation between Pflumm and Joseph 
Podlaseck, in which Pflumm gave Joseph Podlaseck old van billing 
sheets and he told Pflumm that he would "run them through as units." 
The government used this testimony to corroborate DeFelice's testimony, 
and as evidence that Joseph knew that he was billing van trips illegally 
and reached an agreement with Metro to do so. The Podlasecks 
questioned Cubbage's testimony by pointing out that she had been fired 
by Metro, ostensibly because Pflumm believed she had stolen money 
from a Metro checking account, and by questioning whether her 
testimony was consistent with what she had told the FBI four months 
after leaving Metro. The Podlasecks also pointed out that the government 
presented no evidence showing that the van sheets Cubbage spoke about 
were ever taken to EMB or entered into the computer. DeFelice testified 
on cross-examination that she did not remember receiving an unusually 
large stack of run sheets. 
 
Similarly, Roberta Brooks, another Metro employee, testified that she 
asked Joseph Podlaseck how they were getting paid for the van trips and 
Podlaseck said that "We just do." Brooks said on cross-examination that 
she understood Podlaseck to be saying that he made the vans look like 
ambulances. However, she agreed that in her testimony to the grand jury 
she had said that she understood Podlaseck to be saying that he made 
the destinations look like hospitals rather than dialysis centers. Brooks 
also agreed that she had not mentioned this conversation at all in her 
initial interview with the FBI. She explained that the actions of Metro 
had been the focus of the interview. 
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note, which it did. Within one-half hour, the jury 
communicated a second question to the Court: "As a follow- 
up to the above question, is it also possible for the jury to 
be `hung' on one of the counts for a particular defendant 
and not on the other counts?"5 
 
The Court asked counsel whether an Allen charge might 
be appropriate at this time. After a moment to consult with 
each other, defense counsel initially concluded that an 
Allen charge should be given, explaining to the Court that 
simply answering the question "yes" might be coercive. The 
Assistant United States Attorney disagreed, but said he 
would not oppose it vigorously. The District Court decided 
to give the charge. Defense counsel then asked what charge 
the Court would give. The Court answered: "The one I've 
been doing for 15 years and the one that has been 
approved. Why don't you look at it?" Acknowledging the 
Court's view that the charge had been approved, the 
government dropped its objection: "Your Honor, if it's the 
one you've been giving for 15 years, we're not going to 
oppose it." However, after reviewing the charge, defense 
counsel changed their position. Counsel for David 
Podlaseck and EMB explained the defendants' concern. 
 
       Counsel: Your Honor, I'm reversing my decision 
       because there's, of course, in the courthouse various 
       Allen charges and I didn't remember the Court's 
       specific Allen charge, and I understand it's been 
       approved. What I'm worried about is that it's a long 
       Allen charge and then I think that it will sound at this 
       stage, given the length of it, that it's kind of telling 
       them that they have to reach a verdict. 
 
The Court disagreed, noted counsel's objection, and 
rejected counsel's subsequent proffer of a different, shorter, 
Allen charge. 
 
       The Court: I don't think so. Okay. That's the difference. 
       Eventually what I tell them is don't surrender your 
       conscientious views. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The parties to the appeal were not privy to the content of the second 
instruction when they briefed and argued the case, as its content was 
not read into the record. The Court retrieved the question from the 
District Court. 
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       Counsel: But -- 
 
       The Court: Well, that's all right. You're on record, you 
       object to it. I'm going to give it and your objection is on 
       the record. You are protected. 
 
       Counsel: And you Honor, I in fact had someone run 
       back to my office to propose perhaps a possible 
       alternative instruction. And I take it that the Court is 
       not going to consider it? 
 
       The Court: Yes, I'm going to give this one I have given 
       repeatedly. 
 
       Counsel: I do have a shortened version. 
 
       The Court: I'm going to give this one. 
 
       Counsel: Okay. 
 
The Court then brought the jury into the courtroom, and 
addressed them. We quote the instruction in its entirety. 
 
        In response to your last question, the answer is yes. 
       I want to read you another charge. 
 
        The Court wishes to suggest a few thoughts which 
       you may desire to consider in your deliberation along 
       with the evidence and the instructions previously given 
       to you. 
 
        This is an important case. The trial has been time 
       consuming and burdensome both to the Government 
       and to the defendants. If you should fail to agree upon 
       a verdict, the case is left open and undecided. Like all 
       cases, it must be disposed of sometime. There appears 
       to be no reason to believe that another trial would not 
       be equally time consuming and burdensome to all 
       persons involved, nor does there appear to be any 
       reason to believe that the case can be tried again better 
       or more exhaustively that it has been in this trial. Any 
       future jury must be selected in the same manner and 
       from the same source as you have been chosen. So 
       there appears to be no reason to believe that the case 
       could ever be submitted to 12 men and women more 
       intelligent, more impartial or more competent to decide 
       it or that more or clearer evidence could be produced 
       on behalf of either side. 
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        Of course, these matters suggest themselves, upon 
       brief reflection, to all of us who have sat through the 
       trial. The only reason they are mentioned is because 
       some of them may have escaped your attention which 
       must be fully occupied up to this time in reviewing the 
       evidence of the case. They are matters which, along 
       with other and perhaps more obvious ones, remind us 
       how important and desirable it is for you to 
       unanimously agree upon a verdict, if you can do so 
       without violence to your individual judgment and 
       conscience. 
 
        It is unnecessary to add that the Court does not wish 
       any juror to surrender his or her conscientious 
       convictions. However, it is your duty as jurors to 
       consult with one another and to deliberate with a view 
       to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without 
       violence to your individual judgment. Each of you must 
       decide the case for yourself but you should do so only 
       after consideration of the evidence with your fellow 
       jurors and, in the course of your deliberations, you 
       should not hesitate to change your opinion when 
       convinced that it is erroneous. 
 
        In order to bring 12 minds to a unanimous result, 
       you must examine the questions submitted to you with 
       candor and frankness and with proper deference to 
       and regard for the opinions of each other's. That is to 
       say, in conferring together, each of you should pay due 
       attention and respect to the views of others and listen 
       to each other's arguments with a disposition to 
       reexamine your own views. 
 
        If the greater number of you are for one side, each 
       dissenting juror ought to consider whether his or her 
       view is a reasonable one since it makes no effective 
       impression on the minds of so intelligent fellow jurors 
       who bear the same responsibility, serve under sanction 
       of the same oath and have heard the same evidence 
       with, you may assume, the same attention and an 
       equal desire to arrive at the truth. Also, the jurors who 
       constitute the greater number should consider the 
       reasons of those who take a different position to see 
       whether there may be persuasive merit in that position. 
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        You are not partisans; you are judges -- judges of 
       the facts. Your sole purpose is to ascertain the truth 
       from the evidence before you. You are the sole and 
       exclusive judges of credibility of all the witnesses and 
       of the weight and effect of all the evidence. In the 
       performance of this high duty, you are at liberty to 
       disregard any comments of both the Court and counsel, 
       including, of course, the remarks I am now making.  
       Remember at all times, no juror is expected to yield his 
       conscientious conviction which you may have as to the 
       weight and effect of the evidence and remember, also, 
       that after full deliberation and consideration of the 
       evidence, it is your duty to agree upon a verdict, if you 
       can do so without violating your individual judgment 
       and conscience. 
 
        You may conduct your deliberations as you choose 
       but I suggest that you should now retire and carefully 
       reconsider all the evidence bearing upon the questions 
       before you and see whether is not possible to arrive at 
       an unanimous verdict. 
 
        All right. That you very much, ladies and gentlemen. 
 
(emphasis added). The jury left the courtroom at 12:14 and 
returned at 4:10 that afternoon with a verdict of guilty 
against all three defendants on all counts. The jury had 
deliberated for two days before the supplemental 
instruction. The trial had taken nine days. 
 
II. 
 
A. 
 
In United States v. Allen, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), the 
Supreme Court found no error in a supplemental charge 
given to the jury which told those jurors whose view formed 
the minority to reconsider their views in light of the 
contrary views held by the majority. See id. at 501-02. The 
Court found the charge compatible with the jury's need to 
deliberate openly to achieve unanimity, explaining that "[i]t 
cannot be the law that each juror should not listen with 
deference to the arguments and with a distrust of his own 
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judgment, if he finds a large majority of the jury taking a 
different view of the case from what he does himself." Id. 
Subsequently, in Hyde and Schneider v. United States, 225 
U.S. 347, 382-84 (1912), and United States v. Kawakita, 
343 U.S. 717, 745 (1952), the Court found no error in two 
other supplemental instructions challenged as 
unconstitutional.6 
 
However, in United States v. Jenkins, 380 U.S. 445 (1965) 
(per curiam), the Supreme Court granted the defendant a 
new trial based on the coercive effect of a supplemental 
instruction given by the district court. See id.  at 446. The 
jury had declared itself unable to reach a verdict after 
slightly more than two hours of deliberation, and in the 
course of speaking to the jury, the district court stated: 
"You have got to reach a decision in this case." See id. The 
Court held that "[u]pon review of the record, we conclude 
that in its context and under all the circumstances the 
judge's statement had the coercive effect attributed to it." 
Id.; see also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 
U.S. 422, 462 (1978) (finding an ex parte conversation 
between the district court and the jury foreman to be 
grounds for reversal since the jury may have understood 
the court to have been requiring it to reach a dispositive 
verdict). In Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988), the 
Court explained that Jenkins relied upon the Court's 
supervisory power over the federal courts. See id. at 239 & 
n.2, 240 & n.3. 
 
In Lowenfield, the Court considered the appeal of a 
habeas petitioner who claimed that the state trial court's 
actions had coerced the jury's decision to sentence him to 
death in violation of his constitutional rights. During the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In Hyde and Schneider, the Court found nothing in the record to 
suggest a coerced verdict. See Hyde and Schneider, 225 U.S. at 382-84. 
In Kawakita, the Court affirmed without discussion the ruling of the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which had found that given the 
context of the case and the particular effect of the instruction, the 
instruction did not violate the defendant's rights. See Kawakita, 343 
U.S. at 744 (affirming United States v. Kawakita, 190 F.2d 506, 527-28 
(9th Cir. 1951)) (explaining that the issues not addressed by the Court 
were either "insubstantial" or "so adequately disposed of by the Court of 
Appeals that we give them no notice"). 
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sentencing phase of the murder trial, the jury deadlocked. 
The court polled the jury as to whether further deliberation 
would be helpful, and, after most of the jurors said that it 
would, the court gave a second instruction. Unlike Allen, 
the instruction did not refer to the minority jurors. Rather, 
the instruction simply reminded the jurors to discuss one 
another's views and to consider the evidence with the 
objective of reaching a unanimous verdict based upon each 
juror's individual views. See id. at 234. The Court denied 
the habeas relief requested, holding that "on these facts the 
combination of the polling of the jury and the supplemental 
instruction was not `coercive' in such a way as to deny 
petitioner any constitutional right." Id. at 241. The Court, 
however, also explained that: "By so holding we do not 
mean to be understood as saying other combinations of 
supplemental charges and polling might not require a 
different conclusion. Any criminal defendant, and especially 
any capital defendant, being tried by a jury is entitled to a 
uncoerced verdict of that body." Id. 
 
In reaching its decision, the Court first noted that "[t]he 
use of a supplemental charge has long been sanctioned," id. 
at 237, and reaffirmed the "continuing validity of this 
Court's observations in Allen," explaining that "they apply 
with even greater force in a case such as this where the 
charge given, in contrast to the so-called `traditional Allen 
charge,' does not speak specifically to the minority jurors." 
Id. at 237-38. The Court also noted that "[a]ll the Federal 
Courts of Appeal have upheld some form of supplemental 
jury charge," id. at 238 n.1, and cited a number of opinions 
of the courts of appeals limiting the content of 
supplemental charges, see id. 
 
Addressing the merits, the Court considered both the 
content of the instruction and the circumstances relevant 
to determining its impact on deliberations. The Court 
rejected the petitioners reliance on Jenkins because of the 
clear difference in the language used in the two 
instructions. See id. at 239. Considering the instruction's 
impact, the Court noted that although the jury continued 
deliberations for only an additional thirty minutes which 
might suggest the possibility of coercion, the fact that 
defense counsel voiced no objection to the instruction 
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"indicate[d] that the potential for coercion argued now was 
not apparent to one on the spot." See id. at 240. 
Accordingly, no habeas relief was warranted. 
 
Although the petitioner was challenging his state court 
sentence and could not rely upon the Court's supervisory 
power over the federal courts, the Supreme Court, 
nonetheless, considered Jenkins and Brasfield v. United 
States, 272 U.S. 448 (1926), in which the Supreme Court 
had reversed a verdict on the basis of its supervisory power 
because of the Court's decision to poll the jury. In 
Lowenfield, the Court noted that Brasfield, although based 
on its supervisory powers, was nonetheless still"instructive 
as to the potential dangers of jury polling." See id. at 239- 
40 & n.3. 
 
B. 
 
Evolving during the period between Jenkins and 
Lowenfield, our precedent has relied upon our supervisory 
power over the district courts to develop rules governing the 
content of jury instructions which provide guidance to us in 
the resolution of this appeal. See United States v. 
Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1969); see also United 
States v. Burley, 460 F.2d 998 (3d Cir. 1972). In Fioravanti, 
the district court concluded its instruction to the jury by 
explaining that the verdict must be unanimous, telling the 
jurors to confer respectfully with each other and to 
scrutinize the facts from each other's viewpoint, and 
admonishing the jurors not to yield their well-grounded 
opinions or violate their oath. See Fioravanti , 412 F.2d at 
415. The trial court, however, continued: 
 
       While undoubtedly the verdict of the jury should 
       represent the opinion of each individual juror, it by no 
       means follows opinions may not be changed by 
       conferences in the jury-room. The very object of a jury 
       system is to secure unity by comparison of these views. 
       The jury should listen with deference to arguments of 
       fellow-jurors and distrust of his own judgment if he 
       finds a large majority of the jury taking a different view 
       of the case from that what he does, himself. 
 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
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The defendant objected to the instruction, and appealed 
the subsequent guilty verdict. We affirmed the verdict 
because the charge was integrated into the body of the 
main charge rather than coming as "a supplemental or 
dynamite charge to blast a hung jury into a verdict," and 
because we recognized that the charge given was similar to 
charges "grudgingly" approved by this Court in a previous 
opinion. See id. at 420.7 Nevertheless, we prohibited the 
future use of Allen charges, and explained that use of such 
a charge would, in the absence of extraordinary 
circumstances, constitute reversible error. 
 
       Hereafter, in this circuit, trial judges are not to give 
       instructions either in the main body of the charge or in 
       the form of a supplemental charge that direct a juror to 
       distrust his own judgment if he finds a large majority 
       of the jurors taking a view different from his. Such an 
       instruction will be deemed error, normally reversible 
       error. Conceivably, in very extraordinary circumstances 
       the error may be found so inconsequential as to avoid 
       the necessity of reversal on appeal. But hereafter this 
       court will not let a verdict stand which may have been 
       influenced in any way by an Allen charge. 
 
Id. at 420. 
 
Fioravanti represented a watershed in our jurisprudence. 
Its prohibition on the use of the majority/minority 
instruction which was not found to be error in United 
States v. Allen, and its warning that the subsequent use of 
an Allen charge would constitute reversible error in the 
absence of extraordinary circumstances established strict 
limits on the content of the jury instructions not 
necessarily required by Supreme Court precedent. See 
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d 115, 
131 n.4 (3d Cir. 1977) (Adams, J., concurring) (noting that 
Fioravanti supersedes the instruction approved in Allen), 
aff 'd, 438 U.S. 422 (1978). Our decision did not consider 
the issue as a matter of constitutional law; rather, as we 
explained in a subsequent opinion, we grounded our rule in 
our supervisory authority over the district courts and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. See United States v. Meisch, 370 F.2d 768 (3d Cir. 1966); Shaffman v. 
United States, 289 F. 370 (3d Cir. 1923). 
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justified our use of that power as a response to"the 
inherent potential of the charge to coerce" as well as "the 
inscrutable problem of determining in each case whether 
such coercion actually existed." Gov't of the Virgin Islands 
v. Hernandez, 476 F.2d 791, 792 (3d Cir. 1973) (emphasis 
added). In Fioravanti, we recognized the practical problems 
raised by attempting to determine whether coercion 
occurred in each case, and called Allen charges "an 
invitation for perennial appellate review." Thus, we 
described our rule as "a prophylactic device to eliminate 
future vexation." See Fioravanti, 412 F.2d at 420. 
 
Also at play in our ruling was the belief that the 
justifications proffered in favor of Allen charges were 
outweighed by their potential to distort the workings of the 
jury system. Although efficient judicial administration 
clearly favors verdicts over hung juries, we pointed out that 
the "possibility of a hung jury is as much a part of our jury 
unanimity schema as are verdicts of guilty or not guilty." 
Id. at 416. We also addressed the claim that Allen charges 
were justified by their ability to discourage a minority of 
jurors from wantonly impeding deliberations by exploring 
its potential negative impact of the charge on the jury's 
deliberations. First, we recognized that the charge tends to 
endow the majority of jurors with the imprimatur of the 
court. See id. at 417. Second, we concluded that the charge 
served to replace the give and take of group deliberation 
necessary to support the requirement of jury unanimity 
with the influence of an early jury poll. Finally, we reasoned 
that the charge threatened to undermine the reasonable 
doubt standard because a minority vote changed to guilty 
by the coercive effect of the instruction would result in a 
verdict representing less than the collective view of each 
juror separately applying the reasonable doubt standard. 
See id. at 418-19 ("Under any standard other than an 
individual juror's determination, would not `the doubt of a 
single juror in the face of eleven votes for conviction [be] 
. . . per se unreasonable.' "). To address these concerns, we 
suggested alternative language for a court to use when it 
told jurors to continue deliberating and wanted to remind 
them to consult with each other during the deliberative 
process. Our suggested charge did not reference either the 
minority or the majority. 
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       It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another, 
       and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement 
       if you can do so without violence to individual 
       judgment. Each of you must decide the case for 
       yourself, but do so only after an impartial 
       consideration of the evidence in the case with your 
       fellow jurors. In the course of your deliberations, do 
       not hesitate to re-examine your own views, and change 
       your opinion, if convinced it is erroneous. But do not 
       surrender your honest conviction as to the weight or 
       effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your 
       fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a 
       verdict. 
 
Id. at 420 (quoting in part W. Mathes & E. Devitt, Federal 
Jury Practice and Instructions, S 79.01 (1965)). 
 
Two years after Fioravanti, in Burley , we considered a 
supplemental instruction in which the district court 
referenced the costs and burdens of holding a second trial. 
See Burley, 460 F.2d at 998. We concluded that:"[t]o the 
dissenting juror the charge must have meant that she 
should consider the expense of a new trial to the 
government and its imposition on the time of many people 
as a significant factor that could and should persuade her to 
change her vote." Id. at 999 (emphasis added). Such 
concerns, we explained, are simply not relevant to a juror's 
duty to evaluate the evidence and the credibility of the 
witnesses and to vote for acquittal if reasonable doubt 
exists, and reversal was warranted. 
 
Over the last three decades, we have applied our rule in 
Fioravanti on a number of occasions. See United States v. 
Graham, 758 F.2d 879 (3d Cir. 1985); Gov't of the Virgin 
Islands v. Geareau, 502 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1974); 
Hernandez, 476 F.2d at 791; United States v. Alper, 449 
F.2d 1223 (3d Cir. 1971). In two cases we concluded that 
the content of the instruction at issue did not warrant 
reversal because there was no potential for coercive effect. 
See Geareau, 502 F.2d at 935-36; Alper, 449 F.2d at 1233. 
In Alper, we upheld a jury verdict rendered after the district 
court read a supplemental charge containing the language 
we approved in Fioravanti, with an additional sentence 
explaining that remaining deadlocked was an acceptable 
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result. See Alper, 449 F.2d at 1233. In Geareau, we simply 
concluded that the charge -- which was not reproduced in 
our opinion, but which we characterized as "simply a 
statement that jurors were not required to reach a verdict 
but should try to do so" -- was not coercive. See Geareau, 
502 F.2d at 935-36. 
 
In 1973, in Hernandez, decided after Alper and before 
Geareau, we reversed the convictions of two defendants 
because an Allen charge was given as part of the trial 
court's original jury instructions. See Hernandez, 476 F.2d 
at 793. During the court's opening instruction, it twice told 
the jury that if disagreement arose during deliberations, the 
jurors in the minority should be willing to reexamine and 
reevaluate their ideas and exchange their views with the 
thoughts of those jurors who constituted the majority. See 
id.8 Finding no "extraordinary circumstances" because the 
evidence was not "overwhelming," we reversed on the basis 
of Fioravanti. See id. at 793 & n.2. We did so even though 
the defendants had not objected to the charge at trial, see 
id. at 793 ("[A]lthough no objection was made to the charge 
at trial, we find plain error and reverse the convictions on 
this ground."), and even though the charge had been part 
of the original instruction, not the court's later response to 
a deadlocked jury. 
 
Although we have not reversed a jury verdict on the basis 
of Fioravanti since Hernandez, we have cited Fioravanti 
favorably in several recent opinions. See Graham , 758 F.2d 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We quoted the relevant portion of the court's instruction: 
 
       If there is disagreement as to the innocence or guilt of both 
       defendants, or either one of them, those in the minority should be 
       willing to reexamine and reevaluate their ideas and exchange their 
       views with the thoughts of those jurors who constitute the 
majority. 
 
        The same can be said for a disagreement as to whether either one 
       or both of them are guilty of the lesser included offense or guilty 
of 
       the offense charged in the information. If there is disagreement as 
       to which one it is, again, those in the minority ought to be 
willing 
       to reexamine and reevaluate their concepts and their ideas with 
       those in the majority to the end that unanimity might be obtained 
       and a verdict returned. 
 
Hernandez, 476 F.2d at 792. 
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at 883; see also United States v. Price, 13 F.3d 711, 724 (3d 
Cir. 1994); United States v. Fiorilla, 850 F.2d 172, 173-74 
(3d Cir. 1988).9 In Graham , we examined an Allen charge 
given as part of a supplemental instruction directing the 
minority to reconsider their own views, and, although in 
confusing language, also directed the majority, if for 
conviction, to seriously and thoughtfully reconsider their 
views if a "lesser number . . . are for acquittal."10 Graham, 
758 F.2d at 882. We stated that "[i]n principle, if not in 
terms, the charge given in this case cannot be 
distinguished from the Allen charge which we have rejected. 
It thus offends our Fioravanti decision and should not have 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In Price, we found no plain error in the district court's failure to 
instruct a jury that it might return as a hung jury when it responded to 
the questions by the jury. See Price, 13 F.3d at 725. We did not explain 
what the jury had asked, but wrote "[t]here may be occasions where 
such an instruction might be necessary, such as in conjunction with the 
modified Allen instruction prescribed in United States v. Fioravanti." Id. 
In Fiorilla, we considered an appeal from a verdict rendered after the 
district court required further deliberations because one of the jurors 
told the court during a post-verdict jury poll that he or she had not 
agreed with the verdict. See Fiorilla, 850 F.2d at 173-74. In passing, we 
noted that the Court reread to that juror the "portion of the charge to 
the 
jury referring to a juror's obligation to deliberate with a view to 
reaching 
an agreement, consistent with language approved by this Court in United 
States v. Fioravanti." See id. 
 
10. In Graham, the district court told the jury: 
 
       If much the greater number of you are for a conviction, each 
       discenting [sic] juror ought to consider whether a doubt in his or 
her 
       mind is a reasonable one, since it makes no effective impression 
       upon the minds of so many equally honest, equally conscientious 
       fellow jurors who bear the same responsibility, serve under the 
same 
       oath, and have heard the same evidence with, we may assume, the 
       same attention, and an equal desire to arrive at the truth. 
 
        On the other hand, if a majority or even a lesser number of you 
       are for acquittal, other jurors ought to seriously ask themselves 
       again, and most thoughtfully, whether they do not have reason to 
       doubt the correctness of a judgment which is not incurred [sic] in 
by 
       so many of their fellow jurors, and whether they should not 
distrust 
       the weight and sufficiency of evidence which fails to convince the 
       minds of several of their jurors beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 Graham, 758 F.2d at 882. 
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been given." Id. at 883. We did not reverse, however, 
because neither defendant had raised this objection at trial 
and we did not view the record as warranting reversal as 
plain error for manifest injustice. We recognized that in 
Hernandez we found an instruction violating Fioravanti to 
constitute plain error. However, we concluded that 
subsequent Supreme Court precedent required us to use 
the plain error standard, and noted that the Hernandez 
decision had not analyzed the issue under the plain error 
standard or decided whether manifest injustice would have 
resulted without appellate review. See id. (citing United 
States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985)).11  
 
We note that neither the Podlasecks nor the United 
States has focused on the precise nature of the power we 
exercise in reviewing charges of this nature. In Fioravanti 
we exercised our supervisory power, whereas in Lowenfield 
v. Phelps, the Court was reviewing the constitutionality of 
the use of the instruction at issue. Some discussion of 
these two distinct approaches is warranted. 
 
We are convinced that the particular limits on the 
content of jury instructions created by Fioravanti and 
Burley and their progeny, which relied upon application of 
our supervisory power over the district courts, remain good 
law after Lowenfield, which considered whether the 
challenged instruction violated the state defendant's 
constitutional rights and reaffirmed the reasoning of Allen.12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. We are not concerned that Graham found that the "record reveals 
that no manifest injustice resulted from the court's instruction." 
Graham, 758 F.2d at 883. In Fioravanti, we affirmed the ruling on its 
facts. See Fioravanti, 412 F.2d at 419. Our rule simply responded to the 
potential for coercion an Allen charge presents, and our belief that 
appellate review of its impact is both imprecise and inefficient. The 
plain 
error standard also supports Fioravanti's efficiency goal by providing 
defendants a strong incentive to apprise the district court of our rule 
when the use of the instruction can be avoided. In Graham, we explained 
"[h]ad any defendant here timely objected to the charge . . . the district 
court judge could have given a corrective instruction. Indeed, had any 
defendant called the court's attention to this Court's opinion in 
[Fioravanti], there can be no question but that the district court judge 
would have revamped his supplementary charge and given the proper 
Fioravanti instruction." Graham, 758 F.2d at 883. 
12. The use of supervisory power in areas that are not clearly procedural 
has come under some criticism, see generally Sara Sun Beale, 
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Cf. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735-36 (1980) 
(rejecting use of supervisory powers in the context of the 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that ran contrary to 
Supreme Court precedent). Although the Court in 
Lowenfield reaffirmed its reasoning in Allen, the Court also 
explained that its reasoning about the deliberative process 
"applied with greater force" in cases where the instruction 
did not speak to minority jurors, see Lowenfield, 454 U.S. 
at 237-38, and affirmed the possibility that a coercive 
instruction could violate a defendant's constitutional rights, 
see id. at 241. Furthermore, in Lowenfield , the Supreme 
Court referenced rulings from each of the courts of appeals, 
including Fioravanti, and explained that"[a]ll of the Federal 
Courts of Appeal have upheld some form of a supplemental 
jury charge." See Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 238 n.1 
(emphasis added).13 Also cited were the decisions of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases , 84 Colum. L. Rev. 
1433 (1984); Honorable Murray M. Schwartz, The Exercise of Supervisory 
Power by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, 27 Vill. L. Rev. 506 (1981), 
and at least one judge has questioned its use in this area. See United 
States v. Strothers, 77 F.3d 1389, 1394-99 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Sentelle, J., 
concurring). However, as Lowenfield explains, the Supreme Court relied 
upon its supervisory power in reversing the conviction in Jenkins. See 
Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 551 n.2. 
 
13. Other courts of appeal have taken different stances on the 
appropriate content of supplemental charges, and the correct form of 
appellate analysis. For example, in opinions also cited in Lowenfield, the 
Courts of Appeals for the First and Eighth Circuits established rules 
requiring deadlock instructions to direct both the minority and the 
majority to reconsider their views, to include an explanation that the 
jury may remain deadlocked and to remind the jury to apply the 
reasonable doubt standard. See Potter v. United States, 691 F.2d 1275, 
1283 (8th Cir. 1982) (establishing these requirements and two others, 
and reversing); United States v. Anguilo, 485 F.2d 37, 39-40 (1st Cir. 
1973) (citing United States v. Flannery, 451 F.2d 880, 883 (1st Cir 1971) 
(describing the elements of an appropriate charge"in the exercise of our 
supervisory powers")). Since Lowenfield, both of these courts have 
reversed convictions because the district court failed to address each of 
the required points. See United States v. Manning, 79 F.3d 212, 222 (1st 
Cir. 1996); United States v. Robinson, 953 F.2d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(considering both the content of the instruction and its probable effect); 
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District of Columbia Court of Appeals, United States v. 
Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1183-86 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (en 
banc), and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, United 
States v. Silvern, 484 F.2d 879, 882-83 (7th Cir. 1973) (en 
banc), in which those courts relied upon their supervisory 
power as we did in Fioravanti to prohibit the use of Allen 
charges and to avoid the concerns posed by case-by-case 
appellate review. See Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 238 n.1; see 
also Thomas, 449 F.2d at 1186 ("We believe that appellate 
courts should no longer be burdened with the necessities 
and niceties -- and the concomitant uncertainties-- of 
gauging various Allen-type renditions in terms of the 
coerciveness of their impact."). Since Lowenfield, the 
District of Columbia Circuit has reversed convictions twice 
because the district court used an incorrect instruction. 
See United States v. Strothers, 77 F.3d 1389, 1391 (D.C. 
Cir. 1996); United States v. Berroa, 46 F.3d 1195, 1197 
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (rejecting the invitation to reconsider 
Thomas because the court did not wish to engage again in 
case-by-case review). 
 
We also believe that the Supreme Court's decision in 
Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988), 
while imposing limits on a court's ability to dismiss an 
indictment in the exercise of its supervisory power, does not 
require that we depart from our previous rulings. In Bank 
of Nova Scotia, the Supreme Court held that a court should 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
see also United States v. Paniagua-Ramos, 135 F.3d 193, 197-98 (1st 
Cir. 1998) (stating three elements that must be present in supplemental 
charge and affirming district court's order granting defendant a new trial 
because the court failed to convey adequately the second element of the 
charge, i.e., that "a jury has the right to fail to agree"). 
 
More recently, in United States v. Burgos, 55 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995), 
also decided after Lowenfield, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
reversed a jury verdict rendered after finding that the jury instruction 
suggested that the views held by the minority were less valuable, and 
adopted a rule requiring district courts to give balanced instructions, 
warning that an insufficiently balanced instruction would result in 
reversal. See id. at 941; see also Tucker v. Catoe, 221 F.3d 600, 611-13 
(4th Cir. 2000) (finding instruction coercive but denying state habeas 
relief on other grounds). 
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not dismiss an indictment prior to trial as an exercise of its 
supervisory power based on prosecutorial misconduct in 
connection with grand jury proceedings unless it 
determined that the violation substantially influenced the 
grand jury's decision to indict. Id. at 256. At the heart of 
this ruling was the Supreme Court's concern that courts 
should not run roughshod over Rule 52's requirement that 
substantial rights be implicated in exercising "supervisory" 
power over the conduct of proceedings. In Bank of Nova 
Scotia, the Court was careful to distinguish the case before 
it from classes of cases in which "structural protections 
have been so compromised as to render the proceedings 
fundamentally unfair, allowing the presumption of 
prejudice." Id. at 257. For instance, in cases of racial or 
sexual discrimination in the selection of grand jurors, it 
could be presumed that a discriminatorially selected grand 
jury would treat defendants unfairly. Id. Here, we view the 
coercive nature of the instruction to give rise to such a 
presumption of coercion and unfairness. Actually, 
Fioravanti does include a de facto harmless error 
requirement, or a way of rebutting the presumption. In 
both Fioravanti and Burley, we presumed that an 
instruction containing certain content is coercive, but noted 
that we still should consider whether "extraordinary 
circumstances" cause us to conclude that reversal is not 
warranted because the coercive instruction did not affect 
the outcome. We conclude that Fioravanti is consistent with 
the principles set forth in Bank of Nova Scotia , and remains 
good law. 
 
C. 
 
Accordingly, our task is to consider whether the 
instruction given by the District Court contravened the 
teachings of our case law, and if so whether this case 
presents the type of situation that warrants reversal. Before 
doing so, however, we must address the government's 
contention that the defendants failed to preserve the 
objection they raise because their challenge before the 
District Court was directed at the instruction's length 
rather than its content. Our review, the government 
therefore argues, must be for plain error. 
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We disagree. When the District Court decided to give the 
instruction, it told counsel that the instruction was 
"approved." Defense counsel objected to the instruction 
because they found its length to be coercive, and sought 
the opportunity to present an alternative instruction. In 
response, the District Court curtly advised counsel that: 
"You're on record, you object to it. I'm going to give it and 
your objection is on the record. You are protected." The 
Court also denied the defense counsel's request for the 
opportunity to retrieve an alternative charge. Given the 
Court's assurance that the charge was approved and the 
objection was on the record, as well as the Court's brusque 
refusal to entertain further discussion, which by its tenor 
foreclosed further exchange and possibly further grounds 
for objection, we believe that defense counsel satisfactorily 
preserved the defendants' appeal on this issue. 
 
The District Court's instruction addressed the views of 
the majority and minority of jurors despite our clear 
precedent indicating we should avoid a majority/minority 
instruction. See Fioravanti, 412 F.2d at 416-19; see also 
Graham, 758 F.2d at 883; Hernandez, 476 F.2d at 792-93. 
Furthermore, although the Court mentioned both the 
majority and minority jurors, the instruction clearly 
portrayed the minority jurors as holding less intelligent or 
reasonable views than the majority jurors and therefore 
indicated to the jurors that the views held by the minority 
merited reexamination. In fact, in the pivotal paragraph, 
the Court never instructed the majority jurors to reexamine 
their views. While the jurors in the majority were told 
simply to consider whether the minority view had 
"persuasive merit," the minority jurors were told to consider 
whether their own view was "reasonable" given that "it 
makes no effective impression on the minds of so intelligent 
fellow jurors who bear the same responsibility, serve under 
sanction of the same oath and have heard the same 
evidence with, you may assume, the same attention and an 
equal desire to arrive at the truth." We see no principled 
way to distinguish this instruction from the one we 
prohibited in Fioravanti, and which resulted in reversal in 
Hernandez. 
 
The District Court also erred by telling the jury that 
another trial would be both time-consuming and 
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burdensome to all persons involved, because this portion of 
the instruction may have been interpreted by the jurors as 
complaining that if they did not agree upon a dispositive 
verdict, they would have wasted the Court's time and 
energy, and imposed upon the Court and the parties by 
making them endure another trial. Thus, the instruction 
created the potential that the jurors' deliberation was 
influenced by concerns irrelevant to their task in the same 
manner we found impermissible in Burley. See Burley, 460 
F.2d at 999. The government attempts to distinguish this 
case from Burley because the instruction did not allude to 
the economic costs associated with a new trial. However, in 
Burley we found that the instruction referenced both the 
burdens and economic costs associated with another trial, 
and our opinion did not suggest that the combination was 
the pivotal factor. See id. ("To the dissenting juror the 
charge must have meant that she should consider the 
expense of a new trial to the government and its imposition 
on the time of many people as a significant factor that could 
and should persuade her to change her vote.") (emphasis 
added). Rather, our concern focused on the possibility that 
the jury reached its subsequent verdict for reasons other 
than the evidence presented to it. See id. ("[A] juror's 
responsibility is to evaluate the evidence and the credibility 
of witnesses and, if a reasonable doubt as to proven guilt 
persists, to vote for acquittal. The possibility of a hung jury 
and a retrial is not relevant to that determination. The 
jurors should not be told that this circumstance should 
influence them."). 
 
We also believe it necessary to comment on the District 
Court's cryptic statement included at the end of the charge 
to the jurors that "[i]n the performance of this high duty, 
you are at liberty to disregard any comments of both the 
Court and counsel, including, of course, the remarks I am 
now making." This comment could be interpreted in many 
ways. Read in the narrow context of the preceding 
sentences, the Court may simply have meant that the jury 
was not to consider the comments of the Court and counsel 
as facts impacting upon the determination of guilt or 
innocence. Alternatively, however, the jury could have 
interpreted the statement as an invitation to ignore 
previous instructions, or even the reasonable doubt 
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standard, in pursuit of a verdict. We have not addressed a 
charge containing such a comment, although we have seen 
it elsewhere.14 Since we reverse on the basis of Fioravanti 
and Burley, we need not address the point further; 
nonetheless, we would expect that trial courts will take care 
in the future to avoid comments that are not clear and that 
could be interpreted to alter the instructions previously 
given to the jury. 
 
Both parties contend that there is a striking similarity 
between the instruction given by the Court in this case and 
the model instruction provided in many editions of the 
Mathes and Devitt/Devitt and Blackmar, Federal Jury 
Practice and Instructions, treatise. See, e.g., W. Mathes & E. 
Devitt, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions , S 79.08 
(1965).15 The defendants hypothesize that the District Court 
thought the charge was "approved" because it appeared in 
the treatise. The government argues that we "preferred" the 
charge in Fioravanti and Hernandez. We take this 
opportunity to clarify the apparent confusion. In Fioravanti, 
we suggested that a district court wishing to instruct jurors 
to consult with each other should use the language we 
quoted from S 79.01 of the 1965 edition of the Mathes and 
Devitt treatise, sandwiched between two shorter paragraphs 
telling the jury that the verdict must be unanimous and 
that their role is to act as judges of the facts. See 
Fioravanti, 412 F.2d at 420 n.32. In Hernandez, we 
reiterated this suggestion, and noted that the same 
language now appeared in S 17.05 of the 1970 edition. See 
Hernandez, 476 F.2d at 793 & n.3. In both editions, the 
language appeared in identical sections titled,"Verdict- 
Unanimous-Duty to Deliberate." See 1 E. Devitt & C. 
Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions , S 17.05 
(2d. ed. 1970); W. Mathes & E. Devitt, Federal Jury Practice 
and Instructions, S 79.01 (1965). In contrast, the instruction 
the parties allude to appears in a different section titled 
"Supplemental Instruction -- When Jurors Fail Seasonably 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. See, e.g., W. Mathes & E. Devitt, Federal Jury Practice and 
Instructions, S 79.08 (1965); see also Kawakita, 190 F.2d at 551 n.1. 
 
15. The only substantial difference between it and the instruction given 
by the District Court was the additional instruction to the majority 
jurors to see whether the minority view had "persuasive merit." 
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to Agree," which also appeared in both editions. See W. 
Mathes & E. Devitt, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, 
S 79.08 (1965). Since 1977, every edition of the treatise has 
explained that the instruction provided in this section 
should not be given in the courts of the Third Circuit 
because of our decision in Fioravanti. See, e.g., 1 E. Devitt 
& C. Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, 
S 18.14 (3d ed. 1977) (explaining that "[t]his form of the 
charge should not be used in circuits where the court of 
appeals has shown express disapproval" and citing 
Fioravanti). 
 
Lastly, we have examined the instruction given, in 
context, and conclude that there are no circumstances that 
would rebut the presumption of coercion so as to render 
the charge harmless. As we noted at the outset, the 
evidence presented at trial was not "overwhelming." See 
Hernandez, 476 F.2d at 793 & n.2 (explaining that 
"overwhelming" evidence of guilt might create the type of 
circumstance where affirmance would be appropriate in a 
case where the Allen charge appeared in the original 
instruction). Nor does the fact that the jury deliberated for 
an additional four hours after the instruction was given 
dispel the coercive effect or establish the "very 
extraordinary circumstances" by which Fioravanti explained 
"the error may be found so inconsequential as to avoid the 
necessity of reversal." See Fioravanti, 412 F.2d at 420. 
Rather, the coercive content of the instruction, the nature 
of the evidence presented, and the time at which the 
instruction was given, considered together, lead us to 
conclude that the error was not harmless. 
 
We recognize that when faced with a deadlocked jury, a 
district court may, in its discretion, provide further 
instruction to the jurors. In doing so, however, the court 
should do no more than encourage the jurors to fulfill their 
duty, and possibly draw their attention again to the same 
rules governing their task that were explained to them 
during the original instruction. In this case, the District 
Court's instruction, given after two days of deliberation, 
drew the jurors' attention to issues irrelevant to their task 
and returned them to the jury room with the thought that 
the Court believed that the views held by the majority of the 
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jurors were more reasonable, and the knowledge that 
continued deadlock would unnecessarily burden the Court 
and the parties. We conclude that, in this context, such an 
instruction is impermissible under our precedent. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the instruction was an abuse of 
discretion requiring the reversal of the guilty verdicts 
rendered against all three defendants on all the counts. 
 
In light of the foregoing, we will REVERSE and REMAND 
for a new trial. 
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